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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
is to be regarded for income tax purposes as embracing only one-half of the community
property. Thus it is submitted that in Washington, when the entire estate consists of
community property, it is no longer to be considered as a single taxable entity for
income tax purposes. Instead, the income from community property during administra-
tion is taxable one-half to the estate and one-half to the surviving spouse.
JoiN A. GosE
Torts-Contribution among Tortfeasors where the United States Is a Party. United
States v. State of Arizona, 214 F.2d 389 (9th Cir. 1954), highlights the recurring prob-
lem of contribution between the United States and another joint tortfeasor. In the
original case here involved, P sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for injury resulting from an exploding shell picked up on a supposedly dedudded
artillery range which had been deeded by the United States to the State of Arizona. The
United States brought a third-party complaint against the State of Arizona as a joint
tortfeasor, and it is the action on this third-party complaint which is involved in the
instant case. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Arizona law does
not permit contribution from another tortfeasor, and, therefore, affirmed the dismissal
of the third-party complaint. The court asserted that the basis of this holding was
the doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 63 (1937), requiring the applica-
tion of state substantive law to federal court actions.
The opinion cites United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543 (1950), as authority
for use of the Erie doctrine in matters of contribution where an action is brought under
the Federal Tort Claims Act. The Yellow Cab. Co. case arose out of an accident be-
tween a taxicab and a United States mail truck, as a result of which the passenger of
the taxicab sued the cab company; whereupon the cab company impleaded the United
States, and the court held that under the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States
government had consented to be impleaded as a third-party defendant in an action for
contribution, since appropriate state law provided such an action. This was not, how-
ever, an application of Erie v. Tompkins, supra, but was a strict reading of the Federal
Tort Claims Act which provides consent to suit against the United States on account
of damage caused by negligence of any employee of the Government "under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant
for such damage, loss, injury or death in accordance with the law of the place where
the act or omission occurred." (Italics added.) Because Pennsylvania law permitted
contributions between joint tortfeasors, the United States was obliged to contribute
50% of the verdict awarded against the cab company.
Despite the irrelevancy of Erie v. Tompkins, supra, to such a situation, these two
cases are graphic illustrations of the diversity of results which occur in the matter
of contribution when the United States is involved with another as a tortfeasor. The
suit must always be brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, but the liability for
or right to contributions depends on state substantive law which is at great variance
from one state to another. [For a comprehensive discussion of the problem of lack of
uniformity of contribution for the United States see 3 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE §
14.29, at 507, et seq. (3d Ed. 1948).]
Since the common law prohibited contributions among tortfeasors, and many states
have made no statutory provision therefor, those states allow no right of contribution
at all. In six states the right of contribution is conditioned on a judgment against the
tortfeasors in the original action, there being no provision for impleading or third-party
defendant actions. In those states the person injured has sole control of the distribution
of loss by contribution. In the states which do have laws with respect to contribution,
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no two of the statutes are identical. See UNIFoRa LAWS ANNOTATFD, Vol. 9, Cumu-
LATIVE ANNUAf PocET PART 33 (1953).
The question of contribution for and against the United States would seem to be a
proper matter for appropriate legislation. In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332
U.S. 301 (1946), the court pointed out that questions involving federal fiscal policy
should be exempted from the rule of Erie v. Tompkins, supra, so that there might be
uniform rulings made on these issues, but concluded that this was a matter for Con-
gress, rather than for the courts. Certainly liability arising under the Federal Tort
Claims Act is a matter of federal fiscal policy, and since the liability is the result of a
federal statute, it does not seem illogical that Congress should by statute provide the
United States with such protection on distribution of the loss as would be fair and
equitable for all parties jointly liable. The tendency in modem law to eliminate the
common law prohibition against contribution strengthens the argument.
If, however, this matter is to remain within the control of state law, perhaps there
is presented a strong argument for urging the passage of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act in all of the forty-eight states. This would allow liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, as well as the doctrine of Erie v. Tompkifs, supra,
to be applied to the matter of contribution among joint tortfeasors with a uniform
result throughout the United States.
ALIcE D. JoHNsoN
